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Abstract 
The “brain drain” phenomenon encompasses the mass movement of highly educated 
individuals. Highly-skilled and well-educated migrants are moving to more developed and urban 
settings, often in search of a higher standard of living and better wages. Since joining the 
European Union and the Schengen Agreement, Poland and Romania have experienced 
significant emigration which has subsequently affected their health care systems. Motivations for 
emigrating from these two countries and the effects emigration has had on patients and other 
doctors will be considered. The paper also seeks to compare policy responses to the mass 
medical emigration phenomenon in both countries, as well as the outcomes of such policies. The 
main methodology of study throughout this project entails a comparative assessment of the 
governmental policy responses to brain drain. An analysis of Poland’s and Romania’s health care 
systems will be performed initially.  
The analysis includes details on the causes and factors that bring about migration, the 
impact that emigration has had on patients, how doctors remaining in the sending country are 
affected, and what social upheavals and unrest result from such emigration. Following, the levels 
and flows of migration are considered for each country, looking at the type of people leaving, 
whether educated or not, and the range of professions, with a focus on health professionals that 
are migrating from both countries. After an analysis has been performed for both countries, the 
results will be compared to one another, paying special attention to any differences and potential 
reasons for these differences. 
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Introduction 
The era of globalization has been accompanied by the vast movement of people and 
ideas. International migration has grown steadily over the past several decades, seeing an 
increase from 75 million to 215.8 million in a span of fifty years, from 1960 to 2010 (Gibson and 
McKenzie, 2011). These trends are not expected to subside anytime soon. Part of these mass 
migration trends, the “brain drain” phenomenon encompasses the mass movement of highly 
educated individuals, including relocations across borders as well as within internal borders. 
Overwhelmingly, highly-skilled and well-educated migrants are moving to more developed and 
urban settings, most commonly in search of a higher standard of living and better wages. 
Due to the investment that many developing and sending countries make in the education 
of their citizens, the ensuing emigration of these individuals has been of major policy concern. 
Funds have been allocated towards the free public education of these individuals, which they are 
expected to repay through several means, such as taxes, or other contributions during 
employment in their native country. However, when these individuals leave after completing 
their education, such returns are not actualized. The money that sending states had put towards 
education fails to deliver the expected economic growth and development. 
Being unable to compete with the wages and living standards of developed countries 
means for poorer or developing countries that it has become increasingly more common for their 
professionals to seek work in highly developed countries, such as Canada and the United States. 
While many of the poorer states in the world are plagued by political instability, unemployment, 
and violence, there always exists a more appealing country elsewhere. Known as receiving 
states, developed countries also increasingly require the specialized expertise of intellectual 
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elites, in order to keep up high levels of growth and development. No matter how industrialized 
and modern their economies are, without the human work power and capital of educated 
individuals, these assets cannot be utilized to their utmost potential. Therefore, the global 
competition for an educated workforce is increasing, bringing about the massive migration of 
professionals and creating numerous challenges for all involved, but especially for poor, 
developing sending states. 
 
 
Purpose of Research 
This paper sets out to assess the extent to which emigration of medical professionals 
(brain drain) from Poland and Romania has impacted and affected the health care systems in 
both countries. These two countries are the largest additions to the European Union from Eastern 
Europe, and thus could be indicative of trends in other countries of similar backgrounds. Further, 
they are both developed countries experiencing significant amounts of brain drain, a 
phenomenon that is most often associated with developing countries, placing them in a unique 
situation. The emigration and ensuing shortages that Poland and Romania are facing is 
benefitting the western countries of the European Union, which are recruiting medical 
professionals to help accommodate their needs, creating an imbalance in the European Union as 
a whole. The focus of this study will thus be on the motivations for emigrating from Poland and 
Romania, and the subsequent effects emigration has had on patients and other doctors. Policy 
responses to the mass medical emigration phenomenon in both countries will be compared, as 
well as the outcomes of such policies. Both Poland and Romania have seen massive emigration 
among their health care professionals, accompanied with strikes from remaining doctors within 
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the country. By better understanding why these individuals are leaving, the two countries could 
be better equipped to deter further migration, and encourage healthcare professionals to return. 
The main methodology of study throughout this project will entail a comparative 
analysis. An analysis of Poland’s and Romania’s health care systems will be performed initially, 
gaining a better understanding of the specifics of each. The analysis will include details on the 
causes and factors that bring about migration, the impact that emigration has had on patients, 
how doctors remaining in the sending country are effected, and what social upheavals and unrest 
result from such emigration. Following, the levels and flows of migration will be considered for 
each country, looking at the type of people leaving, whether educated or not, and the range of 
professions and what portion of these professionals are medical doctors. A closer look will then 
be taken at the health professionals that are migrating from both countries. After an analysis has 
been performed for both countries, the results will be compared, paying special attention to any 
differences and potential reasons for these differences. A comparison will also be made of the 
policy responses that each country had to the crises. 
The thesis will be organized in three major chapters: a case study of Poland, a case study 
of Romania, and a comparison of the two countries and their policy responses. The same 
information gathered for medical doctors will also be collected for nurses in Poland and 
Romania. The wages of medical doctors and the amount of patients per doctor is seen to be 
significantly different from Western European countries. The destination countries of these 
medical professionals, such as Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, are seen to offer higher 
PPP corrected wages and less inhabitants are present per doctor. These two factors may thus play 
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a significant role in determining the migration of medical professionals from Poland and 
Romania. 
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Push and Pull Factors in International Migration: Remittances, Brain Drain, 
and their Impact on Sending States  
 
Push and Pull Factors 
The increase in skilled migration can be in large part attributed to the globalization of the 
labor market, and factors for migration are found at both the national and international levels. 
Migration is a phenomenon that occurs due to several reasons which stem both from 
characteristics of the sending country and those of the destination country. The varying natures 
of sending and destination countries allows for the separation of motivations for migration into 
push and pull factors. The push factors that are most relevant to potential migrants include 
several that are characteristic of underdevelopment: “poor condition of services, low wages or 
salary, misplacement of talent, human rights abuse, underemployment, political instability, lack 
of research facilities,” etc. (Ngoma and Ismail 747). These factors point to elements of 
corruption and a lack of opportunity for skilled individuals in developing countries to expound 
upon their education further. Eventually, these individuals will feel as if they have hit a barrier in 
their own development, and experience a limitation to further education or promotion. When it 
appears to them that their home country cannot offer them a higher standard of living, brought on 
by economic development and education, they are inclined to look elsewhere for these 
opportunities.   
  When making their choices, immigrants must evaluate the conditions of their potential 
destination countries. Thus, in accord with the push factors, there is a list of pull factors that 
attract migrants. These pull factors are characteristics of the destination, developed countries that 
skilled migrants head towards. These include: “better economic prospects, higher salary and 
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income, better career expectations, better research facilities, modern educational system and 
better opportunity from higher qualification, prestige of foreign training, intellectual freedom” 
and “better working condition” (Ngoma and Ismail 747). These factors represent the qualities 
that the sending countries are often lacking, and set up the grounds for improvement for the 
migrant. The higher standard of living that is associated with such factors effectively attract the 
skilled migrants that are feeling limited otherwise. 
When making their decision to migrate, individuals take potential for advancement in 
terms of their careers and financial situations under higher consideration than any lack of 
facilities in their country of origin (Kangasiemi et al., 2007). Data from 102 developing countries 
show that personal advancement, whether it be career opportunities or research facilities, play a 
leading role in migration. Skilled migrants are attracted to higher wages, though the desire to 
migrate is reduced when the income gap narrows between a developing and developed 
country.  Education is also seen to play a determinant role in levels of migration. Individuals 
with higher education levels are found to be more likely to legally migrate across borders and 
towards more developed countries (Carrington and Detagiache, 1999). Those with tertiary 
educations, asides from undocumented migrants from Central America and Mexico, had the 
highest rates of migrations as compared to other education levels in the United States. This 
shows that OECD destination countries may impact who migrates by showing favoritism 
towards those that are more educated. Educated individuals seek a similar lifestyle to those 
professionals in their field and educational bracket living in developed countries. They seek a 
different standard of living and potential opportunities for their children, which may be more 
readily available in countries outside of their home. This is why the United States, Australia, 
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Canada, France, and Germany, all developed countries, account for a grand majority (93 percent) 
of migratory flows from developing to OECD countries (Carrington and Detagiache, 1999). 
 
 
Remittances 
Remittances are a major area of study in relation to migration. However, disagreements 
arise over the nature of remittances, and whether or not educated migrants are likely to remit 
more. More educated migrants may actually be more likely to remit more. Concerns over the 
continued increase in skilled migration is often associated with equal concerns over a steady 
decrease in remittances, but this does not have to be the case. Instead, a strong positive 
relationship is shown between level of education and remittances, indicating that those who 
obtain higher levels of education, if they send remittances, will send more money home (Bollard 
et al., 2009). The major factor in these levels of remittances comes not from the family 
background, but rather from the higher income and wages that are likely to be earned by skilled 
migrants. 
  Three major reasons, or motivations, for remittances exist: altruism, exchange, and 
investment (Bollard et al., 2009). A special focus is taken to one of these, altruism. Altruistic 
tendencies and considerations often depend on the closeness of family members and their 
dependency on such additional incomes. While skilled migrants do often travel with more of 
their family and are also likely to have larger households and significant amounts of relatives in 
the destination country, low skilled migrants tend to have larger households still in the home 
country. Education does not have a clear cut effect, but rather depends on the likelihood of 
returning home. Educated migrants may in fact be more likely to remit more. The household 
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composition of migrants does not play as significant role in remittances sent home as was 
previously argued. Levels of income and wages earned instead play a larger role in this outcome. 
Due to the importance of remittances for many sending countries, and the continual increase in 
skilled migration, continued research on the effect of education on remittances is recommended. 
However, an increase in wages may not similarly increase the amount of remittances 
being sent to the home country (Faini, 2007). Despite skilled migrants typically earning higher 
wages, they do not necessarily remit more money as sum. Further, these skilled migrants are 
likely to spend longer periods of time working abroad and eventually have their immediate 
family members join them in the destination country. Due to such tendencies, these skilled 
workers thus also have less incentive or motivation to remit to their home country. In these 
instances, brain drain actually results in less remittances. 
        When skilled migrants earn more, their levels of consumption also increase, offsetting any 
potential increase in remittances. As skilled migrants see increases in their salaries and wages, 
they will be able to relocate more of their family members. With less family members in the 
home country, there is less incentive to send back remittances. The balance between wage 
increases and reunification abilities can determine a net gain and level of remittances. Increasing 
skilled migration and brain drain may not benefit the sending country with an equivalent rise in 
remittances. The major reasons for this lack comes from the tendency of skilled migrants to 
come from wealthier families that do not depend on help from remittances and the likelihood of 
these migrants to relocate their families. 
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The Brain Drain Phenomenon 
In the literature, disagreements abound over the nature of the brain drain and its effects 
on sending countries. Arguments exist for both the beneficial or positive and negative or hurtful 
aspects of these migratory trends. Brain drain has been a significant component of globalization, 
and though it has become a global trend, it is not entirely consistent for all sending countries. 
Brain drain is most typically defined as “the emigration of a nation’s most highly skilled 
individuals” (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). These migrant movements usually occur from a 
developing country to a developed country. Brain drain rates tend to be higher for tertiary-
educated individuals than for those with only primary or secondary schooling (Docquier and 
Marfouk, 2005). However, health professionals actually are not as likely to emigrate as other 
skilled professionals (Gibson and McKenzie, 2011). Overall, the rate of skilled migration has 
been increasing along with the amount of skilled workers in a country. Education levels have 
thus been seen to increase in countries, creating a larger pool of skilled workers. 
High-skill migration has overcome the migration playing field, becoming the dominant 
pattern of movement and a major component of globalization. The levels and popularity of such 
international migration have thus become a significant concern for the sending countries, which 
are often times developing countries. The pattern of movement has created a situation in which 
human capital, and skilled labor, is becoming condensed and readily available in concentrated 
areas, while it is becoming increasingly scarcer where it had already been scarce. Educated 
migration and brain drain do not affect countries equally, though. Data on push and pull factors 
show that educated and skilled emigration is not as sensitive to variables of geographic quality, 
such as distance, and that it is likely to decrease based on the level of development. For instance, 
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for high-income countries, brain drain is not as responsive to distance and other geographic 
characteristics. These types of characteristics play a larger role for low income countries 
(Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). 
 Several researchers have argued that the brain drain actually coincides with a positive 
brain gain. Several positive long term effects in sending countries that result from brain drain can 
be identified. When individuals in a sending country observe the potential to migrate and obtain 
a higher standard of living, they are more motivated to pursue more education. Not all those that 
earn these higher levels of education will leave, though. In developing countries, higher levels of 
education have made workers that remain home more productive. Further down the road, 
migration results in the beneficial “take-off” of economies (Stark and Fan, 2007). Once human 
capital is sufficiently high, accomplished through the spread of education, developing economies 
will be more willing and likely to partake in international trade, assisting in its growth. These 
beneficial effects are labeled as “brain gain” (Stark and Fan, 2007). Such patterns have already 
been observed in both India and Ireland. 
Three channels through which brain gain can occur are further identified. First, over-
education has positive effects on children (who are more likely to attain higher education due to 
their educated parents). Secondly, “uneducated unemployment” gives the educated more time 
searching for a job and thus finding a better match for their skills, which eventually improves 
“the industrial structure of the economy” (Stark and Fan, 2007). Third, the educated workers that 
remain in their developing countries could increase technological change and development in 
their home country. The changes may include a readjusted focus on education as well, and 
positive changes in the economy. This has occurred in some instances in India, where some that 
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had intended to migrate but failed to do so, were able to attract foreign investment and generate 
economic growth. Or, skilled emigrants may eventually return home, where they can utilize the 
skills that they had hitherto only been able to use abroad. Brain drain can thus shape the 
traditional economies of sending countries and assist in their development. 
Migration can further result in positive network externalities. However, positive network 
externalities can divide developing countries, leaving some behind while benefiting others based 
on several characteristics. These dividing factors among countries include “the ability of a 
country to capitalize on the incentives for human capital formation” as well as the ability “to 
seize the global benefits from having a skilled, educated diaspora” (Docquier and Rapoport, 
2011). Therefore, it is not only important to have the human capital and advancement, but also 
the institutions and capacity to utilize them effectively. 
Two conditions are needed in order for a brain drain to be beneficial in the long-term. 
The first of these is dependent on skill prices. Variation among skill prices ought to remain low 
in order to still generate strong incentive effects, but should not be on such a low level that 
educational costs become a hindrance. The liquidity of investment in education, which is vital for 
the expansion of education, cannot be constrained. If educational costs become too binding, the 
incentive is gone to invest and to pursue an education (Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). Secondly, 
the actual probability for skilled migrants ought to be low on sufficient terms. This would mean 
that more people are getting educated, most likely with the intention to leave, but not a large 
portion of them are actually migrating out of the country. The relationship between these 
variables would be strengthened when additional factors, such as career choices or networking 
effects, are added to the equation. 
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Some researchers are skeptical that the brain drain is actually beneficial. A survey of 
immigrant doctors in the UK finds that high-income country migrants have migrating as a goal 
itself, and incentives for migration to the UK are overall weak (Kangasniemi, Winters, and 
Commander, 2007). The benefits of brain drain are not plausible in practice due to the regulation 
that is present in medical professions, which hinder the migration of doctors that may not have a 
strong family background of education and development. Migrant doctors are far from a random 
assortment of doctors that vary drastically over educational background, and instead many have 
received education from top universities. By having already attended a top university, these 
doctors are likely not coming from the least developed countries, and are more likely to have 
parents or family members that have pursued similar courses of action. However, brain drain 
may still hold beneficial consequences when it comes to the balance between education costs and 
remittances, though this is still unclear. 
Another typical consequence associated with brain drain is “a reduction in the ‘stock’ of 
better-educated individuals” (Stark and Fan, 2007). This reduction then affects the entire sending 
country by decreasing the average income. If there are less better-educated individuals, there is 
less competition for positions and employment that requires high skill sets. This lower level of 
competition provides a lower incentive for employers to pay higher wages, and less of the 
population is employed in highly skilled professions, subsequently decreasing the average 
income. 
Another negative consequence outcome is that some who have become educated with 
intent of migrating remain in the developing country instead. These individuals would have 
otherwise occupied other jobs in the market, but pursued further education. Many end up 
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unemployed in their home country, and output shrinks. The unemployment of educated 
individuals is common in many developing countries, though contrasts from developed countries 
significantly. The “educated unemployment” is mainly caused by the prospect of migrating and 
attaining a job abroad, which is expected to have higher salaries than occupations in the home 
country. These educated individuals thus are holding out for a better job, and remain unemployed 
in their home country. This issue ensues due to the increase in supply of educated workers in a 
market where the demand for labor remains consistent. 
The costs of education lead to further negative consequences of brain drain. In regards to 
those that have pursued higher education but remain in their home country, “the returns to their 
education could be less than its costs” (Stark and Fan, 2007). These individuals consider 
themselves to be overeducated. This education becomes inefficient in the short term, until the 
home country’s economy has the opportunity to “take off”. The combined effects of “educated 
unemployment” and over-education and their shared effects on the individuals affected are all 
taken into account. These effects are directly related to the proportions that a home country 
holds, where these affected may make up varying proportions of the overall educated population. 
After spending a long period abroad, returning back to the sending country can be 
difficult and full of challenges. Acculturalization is an important factor to consider in the study 
of returners, and it can be defined as “the pattern of interaction between members of majority 
and minority cultures in the target country” (Tung and Lazarova, 2006). According to Berry 
(1980), there exist four major modes of acculturation: integration, assimilation, separation, and 
marginalization. It was further found that out of these four, integration proved to be the most 
functional, followed by assimilation. Living abroad provides different attitudes and creates a new 
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culture for returners, who must relearn how to live in their country of origin. This often involves 
a process of reintegration that can vary drastically from individual to individual. 
Overall, returners were more willing to work abroad than in their home country. Desire to 
leave hinged on the potential for better and more developed career opportunities abroad as well 
as a better quality of life. These factors, however, greatly depended on the level of the Human 
Development Index (HDI) of the home country, showing those in the medium HDI countries to 
be more willing to work abroad again. Despite being natives or familiar with the host country’s 
language and culture, the exposure to foreign practices had a great effect on returners. Returners 
to medium HDI countries faced greater levels of challenges and frustrations. No major 
differences were found among gender or for-profit and not-for-profit sectors. 
 
Policy Responses to Brain Drain 
Globalization has changed the ways in which governments must face and respond to 
brain drain. As the rate of medical migration rises, governments must adapt to ensure that 
deficiencies and imbalances do not manifest within their borders. The current state of 
professional regulatory institutions and systems, however, has not been updating at the same rate 
(Epstein 2012). While borders, especially among European Union members, have become weak 
barriers, the nature of regulatory bodies must change. However, it may be that the “irresistible 
force of globalisation” is clashing with the “immovable object of bureaucracy” and a more 
“flexible” model for migratory regulation could be accomplished by turning away from 
governments and towards the market (Epstein, 2012). Market forces may hold the solution to 
brain drain.  
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Regulatory bodies have been closely associated with the expansion of bureaucratic 
measures due to the eventual plateau of professional development, and thus distinction by status. 
With limits on professional status, the old model is conversely limited as well. However, rather 
than be strongly modified or abandoned, the government-based model has “been subverted by 
inexorably rising bureaucratic intrusion into issues of professional competence” (Epstein, 2012). 
They have not been successful in managing the rise of medical migration, though, and need to be 
revisited. In fact, such migration may be motivated by political reasons stemming from the 
expansion and intrusion of bureaucracy (Epstein, 2012). Due to these limitations and challenges, 
several countries are altering their medical systems from “bureaucracy-dominated models”, and 
have adapted an increasingly “market-sensitive culture working together with clinical 
governance” (Epstein, 2012). These countries have turned to supply and demand relationships in 
order to maintain migratory balance.  
The ultimate solution for developing countries to offset their high levels of skilled 
migration is difficult to attain when the resources are not readily available. For instance, 
individuals may be less inclined to emigrate if their country were able to provide “improved 
conditions, fair remuneration, and education” (Mackey and Liang, 2013). However, these 
improvements cannot be accomplished without adequate resources, and so in order to maintain a 
balance between tackling poverty and investments, resource-poor countries would need outside 
investors (Mackey and Liang, 2013). However, relief funds and organizations have traditionally 
been focused on specific illness-based assistance, rather than funding for governments to 
improve social benefits.  
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A method that some countries have utilized is task shifting, which is the process of 
decentralizing and delegating tasks from top professionals to those who have less specialized 
workers. This process is thought to assist in minimizing brain drain by relieving the pressure on 
healthcare professionals (Mackey and Liang, 2013).  This moves the responsibility of tasks from 
physicians to workers such as nurses and volunteers. Such task shifting has shown a “positive 
impact on health outcomes,” particularly in the process of diagnosis and treatment while 
simultaneously reducing costs (Mackey and Liang, 2013). While task shifting may be able to 
train more healthcare workers, the problem of investment is still present. Proper funding is still 
necessary to successfully accomplish task shifting.  
Some countries, such as Ireland, Malawi, and Thailand, have seen short-term success 
after reorganizing incentive packages offered to their healthcare professionals (Mackey and 
Liang, 2013). These packages included higher levels of funding for research, monetary gains and 
incentives, as well as other areas of assistance. However, although these new incentive packages 
have resulted in alleviating some migration, it is uncertain as to how long such financial 
incentives will be effective. Such methods include reworking governmental budgets, which not 
all countries may be stable enough to accomplish. If they are undertaken, increasing investment 
in these packages would thus result in cutting back on other spending areas, which could hinder 
other healthcare services (Mackey and Liang, 2013). If a country is capable of taking on such 
reforms, though, the financial incentives such as pensions, loans, tax waivers, funding for 
education and training, can attract and retain vital healthcare workers in various areas (Mackey 
and Liang, 2013). 
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Migration is closely related to wage levels, and thus policy based on wage reform can 
have an effect on levels of migration. Wage rate changes occurring due to policy reforms have a 
positive effect on the labor supply (Hall, 2005). When governments increase spending, the 
equilibrium of wages would consequently rise. Since wages, and the prospect of higher wages 
abroad, are a major determinant of migration, this increase in benefits for healthcare workers 
would assist in deterring brain drain. 
Instances of reactionary policy also occurred heavily in Latin America. After key 
transitions in the 1990s, the questions of inequality and poverty dominated social issues 
(Roberts, 2012). Mass protests were seen throughout Latin America, in countries such as 
Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Leftists regimes took power in a great majority throughout the 
region, and a decline in inequality is often attributed to the more leftist responses to the era of 
post-adjustment (Roberts, 2012). These elements of redistribution signal a move similar to more 
neo-liberal policies, with a new way of approaching market-based structures and adjustments. 
However, its new economic shift left the region with low wages and a lack of security towards 
employment (Roberts, 2012). The population greatly supported market liberalization, though it 
also favored a key state role in welfare programs. Thus, people saw the benefit of state control 
over such resources.  
Beyond the reforms of individual countries, the World Health Organization (WHO) has 
also set out to tackle brain drain. In hopes of addressing healthcare professional shortages, the 
WHO Global Code of Practice on International Recruitment of Health Personnel has recently 
been adopted (Mackey and Liang, 2013). However, this code is not binding, but rather is upheld 
on a voluntary basis. Further, it does not effectively address prior losses of health care workers in 
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member states. This does not go to say that the WHO Code has been unsuccessful, as some high-
income countries that are top destination countries for skilled migrants have implemented the 
recommendations set by the WHO Code. These countries are few, though, and in order to 
increase the effectiveness of the WHO Code, a method of financing the proposed policies should 
be explored (Mackey and Liang, 2013). 
There has been no standardized set of responses to brain drain. The prevalent push factor 
for emigration is low wages, and governments have been known to increase wages in certain 
circumstances, though often not to the degree that has been requested by medical professionals. 
Ireland, Malawi, and Thailand went further by expanding financial incentives to include funding 
for research and professional development. The success of such practices is still uncertain in the 
long term, however. Other methods of reorganization within the health care system has likewise 
been attempted, such as task shifting, reallocation of funds, and reassessing the role of 
bureaucracy. Poland and Romania have set out in their own ways to respond to brain drain, but 
often, the responses have been insignificant or lacking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Case Study of Poland 
Poland joined the European Union in 2004 and the Schengen Area in 2007. Despite the 
major modernization efforts and European Union funding and aid, Poland has still seen 
significant amounts of its population migrating elsewhere. By 2007, about 800,000 (2 percent of 
the population) are estimated to have emigrated from Poland (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 
2007).  Within ten years of joining the Union, Poland saw at least 2.5 million young Poles leave 
(Baratyzel and McQuaid, 2014). According to surveys and the Polish Chamber of Physicians and 
Polish Chamber of Nurses and Midwifes, an estimated 40 percent of physicians and nurses have 
considered emigration (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 2007). Already by 2007, Poland saw 5 
percent of its medical doctors emigrate (Easton, 2007). With the low wages and minimal 
professional opportunities to graduates, medical personnel have become “overrepresented” 
among the total Polish emigrants (Leven, 2007). This outflow of these medical professionals had 
affected and hindered the healthcare system in some regions. As ages of the population continue 
to increase, the need for healthcare services grows as well. 
Little data or research concerning Polish healthcare professionals is accessible. However, 
it remains evident that there is a limited level of opportunities being provided in the medical 
sector, and the conditions under which they are available worsens the issue of health care in 
Poland. The aging population of Western Europe has created opportunities for healthcare 
professionals, including those in Poland. However, Polish doctors and nurses have been seeking 
employment abroad due to “inadequate working conditions” and the comparably low salaries 
that are available to them in Poland (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 2007). Polish doctors have 
thus been seeking opportunities abroad, in particular in the United Kingdom and Germany, for 
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their employment needs after ascending to the European Union (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 
2007).  
Important to consider under these circumstances are not just the doctors that have left, but 
the medical students or doctors that intend to leave. As many as 62.1 percent of fifth and sixth 
year medical students across Poland’s universities plan on pursuing employment opportunities 
abroad after their graduation (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 2007). Their main reasons for 
such plans include the benefit of higher salaries available, better working conditions, and the 
potential for new and different experiences. The prospects of employment in Poland were not 
appealing to these students due to the “lack of professional perspectives” offered (Krajewski-
Siuda and Romaniuk, 2007).  
In order for a medical professional from Poland to practice medicine abroad, they must 
first obtain the appropriate and necessary documents from The Polish Chamber of Physicians 
and Dentists. This process was adopted based off the European Union regulations in order to 
identify qualified physicians, and since 2007, they have been utilized according to the Supreme 
Medical Council Resolution No 17/07/V (Kordel 299). Due to these documents, there is a 
tangible means of gaging the quantity of medical professionals in Poland who have intended to 
migrate. Since the year of Poland’s accession to the European Union, 7,323 doctors in Poland 
were issued certificates (Kordel 299). This indicates that 4.44 percent of all medical doctors in 
Poland had sought these certificates (Kordel 299). However, this number does not accurately 
represent the amount of doctors that emigrated from the country. Obtaining this certificate does 
not guarantee the emigration of the doctor.    
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As evidenced from the intentions of Polish medical students, it is more likely for younger 
doctors to leave the country. Indeed, based off of the certificates granted from the Chamber of 
Physicians, the majority of doctors that sought to emigrate were between the ages of 35 and 45 
(Kordel 300). These professionals “are in the best period of their career,” having enough 
experience to be valuable to patients but young enough to still have obtainable potential and 
room for growth (Kordel 300). These doctors thus make up a vital portion of all Polish health 
professionals, and their emigration can have lasting effects on the healthcare sector in Poland.  
As seen from sources such as EUROSTAT, the OECD, and EU professional 
organizations, the rapid increase in emigration of medical professionals following Poland’s 
accession into the European Union also substantially subsided once salary increases were 
adopted in response to medical strikes in 2007 (Czabanowska, 2009). Such a pattern in migration 
may point to a diminishing in adverse effects on the medical sector in Poland, and an overall 
stifling of brain drain from the country. The correlation between wages and emigration further 
points to the reveal of the true motivating factors for emigrating from Poland.   
 
 
Relationship between Emigration and the Medical Sector in Poland 
Europe is facing an aging population, and thus physicians are important to accommodate 
these rising numbers. Countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom are 
experiencing both lower birth rates and higher life expectancies, creating an increasing need for 
healthcare (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 2007). With such situations in these countries that 
further provide higher salaries as well as work opportunities, health professionals from Poland 
are tempted and motivated to emigrate. With about 85 percent of health workers in Poland 
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having considered migrating westward, and about 3-4 percent having done so, the issue of free 
movement within the European Union and the effects it plays on the medical sector in Poland 
must be approached (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 2007). One of the leading challenges for 
the healthcare system in Poland is its ageing population, similar to the situation in other countries 
(Orlewska, 2011). The ageing population increases the need for healthcare, and thus the costs 
associated with maintaining the system. However, due to other challenges, the situation is not as 
desirable in Poland.    
The political past of Poland has continued to have an effect on its medical sector. During 
its communist period, the heavy subsidization of health care occurred. This process came with a 
large cost for the sector as a whole, however (Leven, 2007). Health care professionals were faced 
with lower levels of salaries than were even paid out to unskilled workers, and due to the high 
costs of new drugs, technologies, and treatment, they were largely unavailable to Poles (Leven, 
2007). However, the benefit of this subsidization meant that the medical services offered by the 
state were “free” and open to all citizens. In order for this to be possible, about 8 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product in Poland was allocated for its medical sector (Leven, 2007). Thus, in 
order to provide this free and open health care, the salaries of physicians were largely restricted, 
despite the years of rigorous schooling, coursework, and training that these physicians had 
undergone. 
The prestige of being a physician was not enough for these Polish medical professionals, 
and due to the low state salaries that were being offered to them, they turned to “gratitude 
payments” (Leven, 2007). These bribes came from the patients and were welcomed by 
physicians who were looking to contribute to their disappointing wages. This corruption that 
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stemmed from bribes was utilized to assist the patient in the level of care that was received. With 
the subsidized medical system, the limited availability of medical equipment coupled with the 
long waits associated with medical services, motivated patients to bribe their own doctors for 
attention (Leven, 2007).  
The system of bribes is an intricate reaction to the low wages of Polish doctors. The 
bribes stem from the heavy insistence and reliance that these physicians place on working 
overtime or seeking additional employment in multiple facilities. These healthcare professionals 
are allowed through sectoral reforms to use state facilities for their private patients in the after-
hours, not only creating an extended workweek for the physicians, but also opening the door for 
a difficult situation for patients (Leven, 2007). The physicians oftentimes abuse these privileges, 
presenting their patients with two options: to wait for long periods of time for their free and 
promised health care or, for a fee, to return to that same location at a later time. Polish patients 
must thus choose between the health services that they can access for free, but which inevitably 
come with long waiting times, or to save time and pay for the service out-of-pocket. With such 
situations, Polish physicians are also known to work, on average, longer hours than most others 
in Europe. The low average hourly pay that they face may in part be due to these many hours, 
which average about 282 hours per month (Leven, 2007).  
Another lasting effect from the time of Poland’s socialist period comes from the regional 
monopolization of medical specializations (Leven, 2007). Small numbers of physicians, as well 
as their families, had a monopoly over certain specializations, which thus limited the range that 
these specialists were effective in the country. This process had been institutionalized further by 
the State Medical Boards, which are responsible for allocating funds for training programs. The 
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process of determining where these funds go and the number of specialists hired is an entirely 
internal matter, with no outside scrutiny to attempt to make the distribution more equal across 
Poland. The regional specialization is not guaranteed by such a system of funding, but it makes it 
possible (Leven, 2007).  
Although the exact effects of physician emigration on the health system are difficult to 
distinguish, there are certain conditions that can be attributed to such out migration. For instance, 
staffing shortages can easily arise with the emigration of health care professionals from Poland 
(Sagan and Sobczak, 2014). In 2009, it was seen that across the country, there were 4,113 
unfilled positions for medical physicians, most often positions that required specialists. These 
same specialists are also those most likely to migrate: anesthesiologists and internal medicinal 
doctors. Similar shortages are observed for nurses, with 3,229 vacant positions (Wegrzyn et al., 
2009). These shortages can pose greater strains on the physicians employed throughout the 
system, increasing their hours and further diminishing their hourly wages.  
 
Medical Strikes in Poland 
Strikes by medical professionals in Poland have illustrated the struggles and challenges 
that face the medical sector. Nurses and physicians alike have protested their working hours, 
working conditions, and of course, their wages. In late 2000, Polish nurses began a strike over 
their wages which went on for several months. The protests were widespread across the country, 
with about 154 institutions having nurses that stopped their regular work responsibilities (Kovac, 
2001). Nurses at the time were demanding that their wages double from the 700 zloty they were 
earning monthly to an average of 1,400 zloty ($332). Compared to the average monthly salary of 
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2,000 zloty in Poland, it is clear that nurses were not earning a comparable amount (Kovac, 
2001). Before the protests began, the health minister at the time, Grzegorz Opala, had promised a 
slight increase in the average wages, an increase of about 203 zloty. This proposed increase was 
deemed insufficient by the nurses. Disagreements between the health minister and the nurses 
arose over the nature of the spending being done in health services, with the nurses claiming that 
money ought to be spent “more wisely” (Kovac, 2001). Without major reform to the spending 
policy regarding the medical sector, however, nurses may never receive a high enough wage to 
make them feel that they are earning a living salary. 
Similar situations have arisen in Poland over the wages of physicians and doctors. After 
joining the European Union, Poland’s medical sector had undergone several minor 
administrative changes in attempts to improve the system. One of the more significant changes 
came in 2006, when the selection process for the head of the National Health Fund (NFZ) 
changed (Leven, 2007). The NFZ head is now appointed by the prime minister of Poland, turning 
the medical sector into a more political institution (Leven, 2007). The concerns felt among 
medical doctors were not stifled by these limited changes, and in 2007, issues mounted as 
doctors went on strike, demanding a 100 percent wage increase. They justified such requests 
with the comparison of their wages to other European countries. In Poland, these doctors often 
took on other jobs and shifts in private clinics to compensate for their lower wages. Nurses 
similarly were still dissatisfied with their salaries and went on strike the following year. 
However, these strikes were not met with the wage increases that were requested. The 
government stated that such significant increases would not be possible under the current budget. 
Further, four of the nurses that had gone on strike were fired based off claims that a notification 
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policy had been improperly followed. Such a reaction by the government indicates a tendency to 
push the question of increasing medical professional wages to the side rather than appeasing the 
requests of the protestors. 
The Polish government had deep-rooted challenges with medical professionals, beyond 
the scope of the wage-based strikes led in 2007. Mistrust arose between doctors and the 
government when the justice minister in Poland in 2007, Zbigniew Ziobro, had Miroslaw 
Garlicki, a well-regarded surgeon in Warsaw, arrested and charged with murder and corruption 
(Cienski, 2007). This action had been undertaken as part of the initiative set forth by the Central 
Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA). Garlicki’s arrest was explained as being performed on the 
grounds of not only accepting bribes and payments for medical treatments, but also for 
neglecting other patients that did not pay a bribe. However, Garlicki was not held under arrest for 
long, for it was soon determined that there was no strong evidence in the case against him 
(Cienski, 2007).  
The arrest had adverse effects on health care in Poland, however. Due to charges made on 
negligence in a transplant operation performed by Garlicki, there appears to have been a fear 
among surgeons in Poland to perform similar surgeries. Before Garlicki’s arrest, there were 103 
transplant surgeries in January while this number fell to 34 in April (Cienski, 2007). The fear 
was found on both the side of the doctors and the patients. Despite the weak case against Garlicki 
and the affects it played on medical services, the anti-corruption initiatives of the CBA have 
persisted. In June 2007, an anesthesiologist was arrested and led out in handcuffs, only to be 
released several hours later (Cienski, 2007). In attempts to weed out corruption and any who may 
be involved in it, officers of the CBA have been searching through medical files and calling 
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patients to confirm information retrieved. Doctors have expressed strong opposition to such 
actions, claiming it induces heightened terror in the hospital settings and disrupts their work 
(Cienski, 2007).  
The corruption that the CBA and its officials were claiming is not completely unfounded. 
Due to the low wages, Polish doctors have indeed been accepting bribes from patients to offset 
the long hours they work for low hourly wages. The long-held tradition of presenting gifts to 
doctors in the hopes of lessening long waiting times or to show gratitude for exceptional medical 
attention have continued (Cienski, 2007). These bribes, along with the strike that occurred earlier 
in 2007, exemplify the need to increase wages for doctors. However, the government has instead 
begun their attempt to discover and punish corruption within the system that they do not seem 
willing to fix.  
 The dissatisfaction with the administration was seen during the 2007 strikes, when 
symbols from the Solidarity protests in the 1980s were utilized to criticize the changes that were 
occurring in the medical system (Watson, 2011). Furthermore, key figures from the 1980 
Solidarity movement were recruited to strike with the nurses in 2007, driving the strikes to be 
more symbolic and politically-heated. One of the women that was involved in starting the 
Gdansk strikes in 1980 compared the two sets of strikes. This woman, Krzywonos, claimed that 
the nurse strike in 2007 was actually more difficult than the Solidarity strike, which had 
benefited from a united Polish effort and better weather conditions (Watson, 2011). The 
government in turn set out to further demonize the protesters, with Kaczynski labeling the 
striking nurses as criminals (Cienski, 2007). 
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Policy Responses to Medical Brain Drain 
Overview of Reforms in Poland 
The brain drain phenomenon in Poland is a relatively recent and ongoing matter. 
Therefore, typical responses that have been studied in other countries have not become prevalent 
in Poland’s policies or conditions. For instance, information on remittances is limited and the 
impact they have had on the economy is unknown. Further network externalities and the effects 
on education are also uncertain and may still be developing and improving as a result of 
emigration. However, the true changes and significance of these areas will be understood when 
more time has elapsed.  
Poland has undergone several levels of reform throughout the years after the fall of 
communism. The legal groundwork of the medical sector has experienced two major 
reformations since the early 1990s, with the 1991 Act on Health Care Units dictating the rules of 
the system for 20 years, until 2011. Under this system, healthcare in Poland could be in the shape 
of one of three possibilities: 1) “budgetary units or establishments,” 2) “autonomous public 
health care units,” 3) “scientific research units” (Sagan and Sobczak, 2014). The majority of 
public hospitals were run as budgetary units, covering their cost of operation from their revenue, 
which mostly consisted of payments from the public (Sagan and Sobczak, 2014). With the 
introduction of universal health care in 1999, the hospitals were required to change into 
autonomous public health units. The rapidity with which the change occurred resulted in 
essentially little or no internal changes for the institutions (Sagan and Sobczak, 2014). Despite 
the changes, debts of the hospitals continued to grow and it became evident that this system was 
out-dated and was not functioning sufficiently in Poland. 
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The healthcare system in Poland is in need of major reforms, and the system often 
underperforms in relation to others in Europe. According to a survey conducted as part of a 
Health Barometer Report, Poland scored the worst in the multinational comparison. It finished 
with a score of 1.9 for healthcare organization, the lowest out of the seven European countries 
that were surveyed (Orlewska, 2011). How to address these shortcomings is not clear, however. 
The majority of Poles, about 75 percent, believe that healthcare is not equally accessible to all 
citizens, but likewise, they are not willing to accept higher taxes to improve the system 
(Orlewska, 2011). There is also a significant support of increasing private or optional 
supplemental insurance to offset the imbalance. With the dissatisfaction stemming from the 
system, policymakers will need to introduce new reforms to improve the system and encourage 
its medical professionals to remain in the country.    
With the limited wages available for Polish physicians, wages become a leading 
motivating factor for immigrating to countries that offer higher salaries. However, wages are 
dependent not on legislation from the European Union, but rather on policies from health 
facilities and the structure of the medical sector (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 2007). Poland 
has not succeeded in substantial reforms in these areas, though, due to a lack in “coherent 
national policy” in its medical sector (Krajewski-Siuda and Romaniuk, 2007).  
After its communist period and as the country turned more towards open markets, there 
remained a limited amount of funds and political will that could make significant reforms 
possible (Leven, 2007). The underpayment of medical professions and the limited availability of 
equipment continued the cycle of corruption and dissatisfaction that plagued the system for both 
sides – doctors and patients (Leven, 2007). In order to achieve successful reform within the 
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medical sector, intervention from the government would be necessary. The government must 
take into consideration several elements: “market efficiency, availability, pressures from 
different stakeholders, and costs” (Leven, 2007). Further, the Polish public is accustomed to the 
free universal healthcare system, and is often not willing to sacrifice these services for a “more 
cost and quality focused alternative” (Leven, 2007). Because healthcare and the medical sector 
affect the entire nation, enforcing changes to the system are incredibly risky for politicians, and 
the larger and more significant the change, the more likely it will adversely affect portions of the 
population. This thus drives the discrepancy between what needs to be done and what wants to 
be done to improve the medical sector in Poland. 
Power has transferred among many parties in Poland. With its socialized medical system, 
these power transfers among political parties has significantly affected the way in which the 
system has been modernized and reformed. Each party has had its own agenda and many pursued 
changes to the system that were often undone by the following party that was voted into power. 
The challenges that this places on the medical sector is exemplified by the fourteen Ministers of 
Health that have played a role in reforms in Poland between 1992 and 2006 (Leven, 2007). With 
these fourteen ministers, Poland had fourteen separate agendas and hands affecting the nature of 
its healthcare, in ways that often contradicted each other. Combined with the corruption of many 
high-ranking officials and government employees, the system has been sluggish in 
accomplishing any lasting or beneficial reforms that hinder medical brain drain. 
One of the major changes that the medical system in Poland experienced came in 2003, 
when regional funding became replaced by a national system, the National Health Fund (NFZ). 
The NFZ would be responsible for allocating funds to its regional offices, setting appropriate 
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prices for services, and setting the patient groups that would be eligible for discounts (Leven, 
2007). However, the NFZ faced corruption with the nationalization process. It had become 
evident that the NFZ was not adequately approaching change and handling its responsibility of 
equally distributing funds among the 16 regions. There were discrepancies in the levels and 
quality of care received by patients in different regions and by mid-2003, the NFZ had still not 
been able to transform the care to create equality across the country. Indeed, the fraudulent 
behavior of the fund caused it to be identified as unconstitutional for its failure in providing 
equal health care and treatment for all patients (Leven, 2007). The NFZ still remains in Poland, 
though it has undergone some administrative changes to amend its prior behavior and failures. 
Poland has gone forth in attempting to increase the appeal of medical careers within its 
borders. The country has a significantly lower amount of practicing doctors and nurses than the 
OECD average (OECD, 2012). One way in which Poland has responded to these shortages has 
been through medical education reform. Legislation that was approved in March 2011 effectively 
lessens the amount of time that medical students spend in studies and training (OECD, 2012). 
Such measures may attract more students to pursue medical careers, though it does not guarantee 
that they will remain in Poland. 
 
Commercialization of the Health System 
Major changes occurred for the medical sector in Poland with the Therapeutic Activity 
Act that came into effect on July 1, 2011 after the 2008 world economic crisis increased financial 
pressure on the medical sector in Poland (OECD, 2012). This piece of legislation aimed to 
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transform the nature of public hospitals in Poland into a for-profit company, in line with 
Commercial Code companies (Sagan and Sobczak, 2014). These legal changes were expected to 
improve the financial performance of hospitals and transform them into more efficient bodies. 
The commercialization process was further implemented with the hope that it would strengthen 
the management of these institutions, which could not only improve the financial aspects of the 
hospitals, but thus result in medical professionals becoming more willing to remain in Poland.  
The adoption of such legislation was not directly implemented in response to medical 
brain drain. Its aims were focused on improving the cost efficiency of hospitals, not in attracting 
doctors to remain in the country. However, by addressing the indebtedness of Polish hospitals, 
the government allows for creating a situation under which doctors could be more successful at 
obtaining the wage increases they desire. Furthermore, the conditions under which doctors 
operate would also improve. Early commercialization efforts of public hospitals showed that the 
16 percent that had been transformed appeared to be in improved financial conditions, providing 
“high-quality health-care services” (OECD, 2012). Although this legislation does not directly 
address emigration, it does address systemic weaknesses which could consequently improve 
career prospects.  
The 2011 Act was not the first attempt in Poland to transform hospitals into commercial 
companies. In 2005, the Act on Public Assistance and Restructuring of Public Health Care Units 
made the state able to assist transforming the system. Once the conservative party Civic Platform 
gained power in 2007, major attempts were made to begin the process of commercialization, 
including a failed attempt in 2008 which had been vetoed by the Polish president (Sagan and 
Sobczak, 2014). With the 2011 reforms, hospitals and health care units were now at risk of 
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potentially going bankrupt if poor management and financing went too far. This threat was 
expected to motivate the utmost professionalism in unit management, increasing efficiency and 
profits. However, this could be accomplished by not only maximizing the usage of beds within 
the hospitals, but also cutting back on staff (Sagan and Sobczak, 2014). Such conditions could 
severely affect medical professionals, whose jobs could be sacrificed for the sake of increasing 
profits.  
As seen through other studies performed on the equality of the Polish healthcare system, 
patients and citizens already consider Poland as not managing an equally accessible system. The 
2011 Therapeutic Activity Act could cause this issue to worsen. The Act allowed for institutions 
to remove unprofitable services from their repertoire, which could further create a system that is 
dependent on region and institution, one that is intrinsically unequal due to the independence in 
decision-making of each unit.   
 Poland’s medical brain drain has not been massive, though it has been significant in 
showing inherent problems within the health care system. Although the government has not 
directly responded through legislative reform on an effective level, changes such as 
commercialization of public hospitals may be a start to creating an efficiently-run system. 
However, the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the unrest that remains among medical professionals 
needs to be appropriately addressed and managed in order to create an environment within which 
doctors and nurses feel safe practicing. Similar issues have arisen in Romania, though the rate of 
medical brain drain has been far greater and the responses less targeted towards creating a more 
equal system.  
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Case Study of Romania 
On 1 January in 2007, Romania joined the European Union. This accession saw a steady 
increase in the emigration of medical professionals from Romania, with already 100,000 doctors 
migrating west between 2007 and 2013 (Feraru, 2013). Further, an average of 400 doctors each 
month apply to the Ministry of Health to work abroad. With such a flow of medical brain drain 
from Romania, a shortage of workers becomes evident and many counties suffer from a lack of 
doctors and specialists. The distrust that has arisen between the government that cannot 
efficiently manage the medical sector and the youth, and thus including young doctors and other 
medical professionals, has motivated many to leave the system and the country. 
     One of the leading factors determining the out migration of Romanian doctors is based on 
the unsatisfactory level of wages. Indeed, even though the level of confidence within their 
doctors is high, Romanian patients express dissatisfaction with their doctors’ wages and their 
working conditions, which can in turn affect the quality and length of care. Doctors in Romania 
strive to improve the recognition and respect which they receive from society and their 
government, and ultimately increase the potential for professional achievement (Feraru, 2013). 
The main challenges that doctors face in Romania are their low wages, limited amount of staff 
for support, and the available technology and equipment. 
 Other reasons identified by medical professionals for their leaving Romania include 
“wages, working conditions, promotion, facilities offered by the organization that provides the 
necessary comfort, socialization opportunities, public recognition of the value of their work” 
(Feraru, 2013). These factors determine the level of satisfaction felt for medical professionals, 
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and the challenges faced within the system in Romania cause these levels to often be lower than 
acceptable for the employees. A sense of imbalance is further felt among doctors when they 
consider their own experiences and background and what the medical sector in Romania can in 
turn offer them (Feraru, 2013). A lack of professional development in the region can cause 
doctors, specialists, and nurses to look for opportunities in other areas. Therefore, with such a 
situation in Romania, doctors feel motivated to emigrate and search for jobs elsewhere, such as 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy.  
 According to Vaile Astarastoae, head of the Romanian College of Physicians, such 
medical brain drain will continue to occur and worsen the health care crisis that is a result of the 
deficient of medical professionals. The quantity of public hospital doctors has dropped from 
20,000 in 2011 to 14,500 in 2013, and unless the government initiates action to improve the 
conditions, such numbers will likely continue to drop (Stafford, 2014). The issues of wages, 
professional opportunity, and prestige will need to be amended to appease the motives of 
emigration. Migration has become an easier task since accession into the European Union, and 
these EU countries are often the destination for doctors, due to similar cultures and their ability 
to communicate in other languages (Stafford, 2014).  
  
Relationship between Emigration and the Medical Sector in Romania 
Among the Romanian population of 22 million, only about 6.5 million contribute to the 
health care system (Holt, 2012). At 5.5 percent of their monthly income going towards the state 
health insurance fund, this does not leave enough money for an efficient system. Patient groups 
claim that some of the funds allocated for their health care insurance has been lost due to 
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corruption or mismanagement in the system, creating a further strain on the already limited funds 
(Holt, 2012).This lack of funding becomes evident in the poor shape of many hospitals across the 
country, which often lack updated technology and equipment, and difficulties to improve due to 
the debt already incurred by them. Combined with the understaffing issue caused by emigration, 
patients are found suffering from poor treatment and requests for bribes. 
The outflow of medical professionals is also not balanced across all regions of Romania. 
There is a large discrepancy between rural and urban areas, showing that in 2011 there were 
46,949 doctors in urban areas, or about 89 percent of the total amount. In comparison, only 5,592 
doctors were located in rural areas, or about 11 percent (Feraru, 2013). Further, there are 
reported about 100 rural towns in Romania that do not have a single doctor available. Urban 
areas are thus see as obtaining and recruiting doctors from not only the urban universities, but 
also from surrounding rural areas, creating an imbalance and a disadvantage for patients living in 
rural areas. The urban settings within large cities are comparable to other centers in western 
Europe, contrasting with the difficult and imbalanced conditions of rural areas, where doctors are 
often forced to improvise solutions due to lack of equipment and treatments (Stafford, 2014). 
Working in rural areas tends to be a last choice for physicians and specialists, who are seen to 
prefer taking positions are representatives for drug companies or going abroad as preferable to 
working in the rural parts of Romania (Feraru, 2013). This leaves regional inequality in medical 
coverage and a shortage of doctors in conditions that are already more difficult to sustain. An 
exact number of vacancies could not be found for doctors or nurses, though the observable 
difference between the 56,000 physicians in 1989 and the 39,896 physicians in 2013 points to the 
shortages that the system is facing (Feraru, 2013). 
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 Even when doctors remain in positions that keep them outside of urban centers, 
dissatisfaction often arises from their working conditions. Harsh conditions are not isolated to 
rural settings, however. Romanian doctors often face a lack of medical equipment and treatments 
for their patients, as well as limited access to medicines (Feraru, 2013). The poor financial 
structure of the medical system in Romania makes it more difficult for doctors to administer 
proper treatment to all of their patients, further causing a strain on the respect and recognition 
their receive from society. Along with these working conditions that can hinder the effectiveness 
of the treatment, doctors face corruption within the system itself (Feraru, 2013).  
 Economic reasons are most often the leading causes for emigrating. This is no different in 
the case of medical professionals emigrating from Romania. The differences between wages in 
Romania and abroad are drastically different. The average monthly salaries of doctors practicing 
in Romania range between EUR 500 and 600, while in other countries within the European 
Union these monthly salaries average between EUR 2000 and 3000 (Feraru, 2013).  
 Beyond lower wages, the doctor/patient ratio in Romania is significantly lower than in 
other countries in Europe. In relation to the European Union average, Romanian has one third 
less medical professionals per one thousand people (Feraru, 2013). The state continues to lose 
money as it treats its domestically-trained medical doctors as investments. The state is 
responsible for spending about RON 5,000 each year of schooling as well as RON 21,000 during 
the residency stage (Feraru, 2013). Over the course of six years, these costs accumulate and 
about RON 21,000 are spent, the equivalent of EUR 11,300. With such costs going into training 
and educating doctors and specialists that end up leaving upon graduation, the state is not 
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receiving any return on the money it has set forth, deepening the financial struggles that the 
medical sector is experiencing.   
 
Medical Strikes 
    Medical professionals have responded to their unsatisfactory wages through strikes. In 
November of 2013, doctors threatened to go on strike. With these threats under hand, Romanian 
Prime Minister Victor Ponta introduced a scholarship program for resident doctors in Romania. 
The scholarships would consist of 150 euros per month during the residency of the doctor which 
would act as an addition to their salary of 200 euros. However, doctors had requested a doubling 
of their salaries prior to the strike. Doctors and nurses marched through the streets of Bucharest, 
requesting higher wages and improved working conditions. The demonstrations turned highly 
symbolic, with crosses and coffins being carried by the strikers to paint an image of the death of 
the health system in Romania.  
    These issues persisted through the summer of 2015, when August saw doctors and 
nurses threaten to strike once more. These striking efforts were a reaction to the Romanian court 
ruling on bribes, claiming that doctors and nurses would not be legally able to accept such 
payments and gifts. To appease the doctors and nurses, Prime Minister Ponta increased wages by 
25 percent. Prime Minister Ponta stated that if he had the ability to raise wages further, he would 
have, and that reforms to the health care system were necessary. However, the system of bribery 
has become one that doctors and nurses have come to depend on due to their relatively low 
monthly wages. Such a wage increase did not come as an organic reform to the system, but 
rather as an attempt to stifle a strike. 
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Romanian Policy Responses to Medical Brain Drain 
Similar to the case of Poland, the longer lasting effects of emigration cannot yet be 
determined for Romania. The consequences typically seen in other countries, such as positive 
network externalities, increase in levels of education, and remittances are still unclear for these 
countries. More immediate responses, then, are seen through certain minimal policy concerns or 
action taken by medical professionals, such as strikes and protests. 
The Romanian system attempted reforms that had the potential to place it higher among 
its fellow European Union counterparts. The European system hold on to the principle of 
providing universal health care, though beyond this, the application varies across the continent. 
After difficult transitions in December 1989 with the drastic political change, Romania 
experienced years of slow health care reform. The efficiency of the Romanian medical system, as 
all other medical systems, is dependent upon, more than anything else, the level of funding and 
the effective nature of the usage of such funds. Further, the structure of the population and socio-
economic development coupled with the perceptions held by patients are mirrored within the 
type of policies adopted by the government (Purcărea and Coculescu, 2015). 
In order to adopt an effective policy response to the medical brain drain that Romania is 
experiencing, the government ought to focus on reforming working conditions, salaries, moral, 
and decentralization of management skills (Feraru, 2013). In order to properly address these 
matters, the system itself and the organization of its finance need to be restructured. Medical 
professionals cannot continue leaving the country in such high numbers if the government can 
hope to amend the flaws inherent within its healthcare system. To keep physicians and nurses 
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within the Romanian borders, the question of wages, working conditions, and professional 
development need to be addressed and optimized.  
Without significant national reform towards health care policies taking place in Romania, 
the medical brain drain will continue to grow. There had been a limited response to attempt and 
stifle such out migration from the country which could not compete with the pull factors of more 
developed countries to the west (Feraru, 2013). These other countries, such as Germany, Italy, 
the United Kingdom, and France, have more attractive economic and budgetary policies that 
appeal to medical professionals leaving countries such as Romania. 
Reforms to the health care system have been attempted. In 2012, new legislation failed to 
pass, and instead was met with massive protests by tens of thousands of citizens in mid-January 
(Holt, 2012). These protests resulted from the resignation of Raed Arafat, a popular health 
minister, who was opposed over a health-care bill (Holt, 2012). The legislation and its associated 
reform were concerned with the nature of insurance in Romania. The proposed reform would 
have replaced state-controlled health insurance with private insurance. Such reforms were 
intended to curb corruption that arose from politically linked firms obtaining preferential 
contracts from the government (Holt, 2012). However, patients and doctors felt that a switch to 
private insurance would cause health care to become too expensive. With the violent protests that 
swept across cities in Romania, the bill was withdrawn and Arafat returned to his former position 
(Holt, 2012).  
The government has attempted several times to introduce reforms for the health care 
system, but they have not been popular among doctors and patients. Reform within the system, 
though, is not only necessary, but urgent. Doctors’ unions and patient groups insist that for 
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reform to be meaningful and beneficial for Romania, the severe underfunding of the medical 
sector needs to be addressed, an issue that has previously been deemed by Romanian leadership 
as not a priority or major concern (Holt, 2012). They argue that simply moving the same amount 
of funds from one set of hands to another will not solve the issues that have been pushing doctors 
to leave or request bribes. In order for an effective system to emerge, there needs to be sufficient 
funding.  
    Even with years of transitional reforms, Romania has yet to address “the need to 
increase the volume of system resources, the need to increase transparency, to revitalize the 
primary health care, to recover the personnel deficit in all major specializations, to eliminate 
corruption” among other concerns (Drăgoi and Ţarțavulea, 2014). The response has been 
adoption of elements of other systems found in Europe, though without the required commitment 
on a national scale. They have thus left disappointed effects on the system. Among these failed 
attempts are those concerning co-payment and merged hospitals. 
    The co-payment system of health care consists of patients contributing directly to the 
cost of their medical services. Such a plan is expected to deter patients from seeking unnecessary 
medical service, as it would cost them (Drăgoi and Ţarțavulea, 2014). Such a system, however, 
puts a strain on low-income citizens, those chronically ill, or high risk patients, who may not be 
able to afford such co-payments for treatment. A co-payment system would assist in stabilizing 
health care spending and offset deficits in funding. In Romania, a co-payment system had been 
introduced without any specific expectations or evaluations, with no estimations made 
beforehand of the impact that it would have on health care. Further, the co-payment system in 
Romania was implemented only in primary care. It is an additional charge calculated at the end 
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of the patient's treatment, and does not apply to emergency care. By applying this additional 
charge unevenly across services, it encourages within the country a move toward emergency and 
ambulatory care (Drăgoi and Ţarțavulea, 2014).  
    Romania has also set forth an initiative to reorganize and merge hospitals. However, 
hospitals in varying counties in Romania showed either a deficit or a surplus of hospital beds, 
indicating that the resources were there, but they were inefficiently distributed. These imbalances 
were not taken under consideration during the readjustment attempts, creating an ultimately 
inefficient merge (Drăgoi and Ţarțavulea, 2014). Proper planning had not occurred before 
merging hospitals. Those with deficits ought to have been coupled to those that were 
experiencing a surplus, taking distance to patients and specialists into consideration as well. 
However, the reform had not experienced essential assessment before implementation. 
With the lack of a centralized effort to reform the medical sector, Romanian doctors face 
many pull factors among the other EU member states which significantly contribute to the brain 
drain. Romania cannot afford to lose doctors at similar rates for much longer. The workforce of 
doctors has dropped to about 40,000 across the country, making it the lowest density of medical 
professionals within the European Union (Chiscop, 2013). The slight wage increases and 
stipends being offered after extensive medical strikes are not enough to maintain its population 
of doctors and nurses, however. The co-payment and reorganization programs could assist in 
increasing available funds for the health care system, though their implementation needs to be 
addressed in an effective and efficient manner. In their current state, they may decrease equality 
of health services across the country, putting a further strain on medical professionals. Romania 
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and Poland have thus addressed their medical brain drain in different manners and ought to 
continue the process of developing a system that satisfies both doctors and patients.  
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Comparison of Romania and Poland 
Assessment of Policy Responses to Medical Brain Drain in Poland 
 Poland introduced universal health care in 1999, and the transitional period it allowed for 
hospitals to function as autonomous public health units was limited and insufficient. The changes 
that occurred did not effectively address Poland’s problem of growing debt in the medical sector, 
and instead the debt continued to grow. This early shortcoming foreshadowed future challenges 
that the system would face, especially once joining the European Union. The country 
consistently underperforms in relation to other European systems, has general dissatisfaction 
among patients, and has high rights of medical brain drain.  
 The major motivation for Polish medical professionals to emigrate from the country is 
their low wages. The levels of emigration in turn negatively affect the system as a whole, 
creating an unequal distribution of physicians and specialists, resulting in staffing shortages. 
These shortages then contribute to the lack of medical equipment and treatments available to 
patients, increasing waiting times for medical care and services. With wages thus being the root 
of the issue, Poland’s government ought to address emigration and the main push factors for such 
out migration.  
 The Polish system has been lacking a coherent national policy, however, and thus has 
been missing any meaningful and efficient reform to the system (Krajewski-Siuda and 
Romaniuk, 2007). The policy set towards medical professionals’ wages is not dependent on 
European Union policy or legislation, and thus must be a national initiative taken on by the 
Polish government and health minister. Medical doctors have outwardly expressed their 
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dissatisfaction with their wages not only through emigrating from the country, but also through 
organized strikes. These strikes point to the inherent challenges, and the extent of such 
challenges, that doctors and patients face while working in the Polish medical sector.  
 The Polish government did not respond efficiently to the strikes that medical 
professionals undertook in 2000 and 2007. The 2007 strikes were especially poorly received, 
despite their powerful symbolism dating back to the Solidarity movement. These strikes sought 
to express the need for higher wages among doctors and nurses, and were indicative of the lack 
of reform that the system had experienced, even with the head of the NFZ being appointed by the 
prime minister. The issue of long hours and low monthly wages were dismissed by the Polish 
cabinet as unsolvable under the current level of funding for the system. The request for a 100 
percent wage increase was not met under the budget limitations.  
However, this lack of response was doubled with a negative onset of reactions by the 
government. Distrust between medical professionals and the government heightened as four 
nurses were fired as a result of the 2007 strikes. Further, the introduction of the Anti-Corruption 
Bureau (CBA) and actions undertaken by Zbigniew Ziobro, the justice minister in Poland saw 
attacks on medical professionals. Arresting physicians and specialists, such as Miroslaw 
Garlicki, a well-regarded surgeon, did not resolve or hinder challenges within the system. Such 
government action through the CBA created fear among both doctors and patients. Surgeons 
were not as willing to perform surgeries that had led to Garlicki’s arrest and patients were more 
apprehensive of similar procedures. The CBA continued its anti-corruption raid by searching 
medical files and interviewing patients. Such action on the part of the government has not been 
an effective means of resolving issues within the system of encouraging medical professionals to 
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remain in the country. The major corruption charges have arisen form the system of bribes that 
arose within the system. These bribes are symbolic of the wage-related issues that plague 
medical professionals. By arresting those who accept these bribes, the government shows its lack 
of willingness to address the true ailment within the system.  
The policy responses by the Polish government have not been an effective means of 
slowing medical brain drain. The entire system of reform has shown a lack of cohesion and 
national goals. The rapid transition among Ministers of Health and their unique contributions or 
redactions has left the medical sector with a disjointed set of initiatives. It has not been 
successful in responding to the claims of inequality, felt by both patients and doctors. The 
Therapeutic Activity Act of 2011 set forth a commercialization of the health system in Poland. It 
hoped to strengthen the management of hospitals and improve financial aspects of their 
operation. However, by creating a more commercial system, it set forth to accomplish efficiency 
and cost-saving methods, including maximizing space in hospitals by increasing usage of beds 
and cutting back on staff. Such policy responses are indicative of the lack of serious attempts to 
reform the system to appeal to concerns brought up by doctors and patients. 
Taking the levels of medical professionals emigrating from Poland and the clear reasons 
they present even as students for their reasons of leaving, the government ought to pass reforms 
that would appeal to the voiced concerns. This process must begin with allocating more 
resources for health care, which has been underfunded and thus suffering inequality, long 
waiting periods, and shortages as a result. Poland has strayed away from such methods of 
allocation, though, as their economy has taken a page from neo-liberal philosophy, depending on 
the free market to solve social problems. This reliance on the free market may be symptomatic of 
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its recent communist past, and the general distrust of the system that people in Poland still feel. 
However, this system has not benefited the medical sector. Instead, wages have increased in 
other areas, such as among the military and banking. While similar policies were successful in 
Latin America, the perspective of government control and intervention may be key to 
understanding this discrepancy. The Polish population is fearful of state control over welfare and 
resources, still remembering the communist past of the twentieth century. Their apprehension 
may be hindering the true potential of such neo-liberal philosophies.  
With more resources headed towards the medical sector, the government could then 
increase wages in order to remain competitive with the other European Union countries. Further 
change needs to come with the perception of medical professionals and their relationship with 
the government. The Anti-Corruption Bureau does not create a work environment that is 
preferable for such professions, and can easily by avoided by doctors by simply moving abroad. 
The nature and aims of this government agency should thus be reconsidered and restructured to 
truly benefit patients and doctors alike, rather than taking an offensive against medical 
professionals. Such changes would show the initiative to take direct responses to medical brain 
drain, which has otherwise gone mostly unmentioned.  
 
Assessment of Policy Responses to Medical Brain Drain in Romania 
  Romania holds some of the lowest paid medical professionals in Europe, and its system 
falls behind many of its neighbors and co-members of the European Union. It has seen 
significant medical brain drain, which has placed a further strain on challenges within the sector. 
Romania’s health expenditure falls below 4 percent of its GDP, indicative of an underdeveloped 
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health system (Drăgoi and Ţarțavulea, 2014). Indeed, in Romania, resources are seen 
concentrated in urban areas, including physicians and specialists. Romania has attempted to 
resolve the distribution problem its hospitals face by merging hospitals. However, proper 
assessments and evaluations were not taken into consideration during the process and the 
mergers were not successful. Hospitals with bed deficits were not appropriately coupled with 
hospitals that were facing bed surpluses, leaving further conditions that need to be addressed to 
create an effective system. 
 The co-payment program that Romania has introduced into its health care system is an 
effective manner in which to increase available funds to further reform the system. In of itself, 
though, such a program is not sufficient to fix the inherent problems. For instance, a co-payment 
system offsets the need for bribes within Romania, which had been deemed illegal by the 
Romanian Court regardless. Doctors and nurses showed the upset such a decision caused by 
striking. Co-payment thus does not necessarily change the situation for patients, who must 
contribute additional funds to receive treatment regardless. It does change who the payments go 
to, though, and it is no longer directly into the pockets of medical professionals. These bribes had 
been an important reaction to the low wages that medical doctors receive, and so co-payment 
programs do not assist them in earning more money.  
 Romania has also attempted, and failed, to implement an insurance switch. The proposed 
legislation would have implemented private insurance over state-controlled health insurance. 
This move was again an action against the corruption that grew inherent within the Romanian 
system. With the legacy of communism still tainting the medical sector, Romania has a weak 
private medical sector which has resulted in minimal competition among insurers (Chiscop, 
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2013). This lack of competition within the medical sector aids in the expansion of inefficiency 
and further creates a job scenario in Romania that does not benefit doctors.  
The privatization attempts were not introduced to deter medical brain drain but rather 
build contracts with other insurance agencies, and it was thus not held for the initial benefit of 
patients and doctors. Violent protests resulted from such propositions, while doctors’ unions and 
patient groups claimed that such reforms would not be beneficial for Romania. These proposed 
changes were viewed as radical under the current system, where Romanians pay 5.5 percent of 
their income and their employers pay 5.2 percent into the state-run system (Bunduc, 2011). The 
protests succeeded in delaying any positive action on the proposed legislative reform. Rather 
than adhering to such requests, the Romanian government has not taken proper action to 
implement reforms of a different nature. 
Rather than taking action to improve working conditions and health care services, the 
measures undertaken by the Romanian government have been increasing the problem. For 
instance, in 2009 a law was adopted that aimed to reduce differences among salaries of the health 
sector and other public sectors but resulted in maintaining the same discrepancies (Chiscop, 
2013). Austerity measures further increased challenges in the system. In 2010, under these 
austerity measures, salaries were cut in the public sector, increasing the frustration and 
grievances of medical professionals further. These cuts amounted to a 25 percent decrease and 
included a freeze on any further recruitment to the health care sector (Chiscop, 2013). Such 
initiatives by the Romanian government do not motivate medical professionals to remain in 
Romania, but rather act to push them out of the country. It is evident that budget constraints 
remain within the administration of the health system, however, Romania does not spend as 
50 
 
much on its health services as other countries. A change in the allocation of such government 
funds may be the first step towards effective reform. 
As in Poland, the mention of brain drain has been minimal or nonexistent for the 
government. It is a problem that needs to be addressed directly, and the easiest way to discover 
why medical professionals are leaving is through assessing their reasons for continually striking. 
The issues have been laid out clearly for the government: low wages and the illegality of bribes. 
Either way, these issues both point to the low wages that are offered to medical professionals in 
Romania. These wages cannot compete with other European Union member states, which show 
wages at multiple levels higher. Thus, in order to address brain drain, the government in 
Romania, as in Poland, ought to allocate more resources to the functioning of the medical sector 
and subsequently increases salaries for doctors and nurses. More extreme measures may also be 
available, such as charging individuals who have obtained a free higher education and 
immediately leave the country. However, as members of the European Union, Poland and 
Romania would need to fall in line with EU expectations and regulations, and such changes may 
not be a viable option for these countries. Therefore, they must resort to improving the working 
conditions, rather than focusing on restructuring the medical sector itself. 
 
Comparison of the Effectiveness of Reforms 
 The major overarching theme of concern in both Poland and Romania is the low wages 
offered to medical professionals. Medical doctor PPP corrected wages in 2011 range between 
$1498 and $3222. In Romania, these wages range from $808 to $1819. The destination countries 
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for medical professionals emigrating from Poland and Romania show a significantly higher rate 
of pay. For instance, the PPP corrected wages in France range from $4271 to $7383, in the 
United Kingdom from $2052 to $9155, in Italy from $4241 to $9425, and in Germany from 
$3652 to $7098. These differences in wages for the same position across the European Union 
shows a clear motivation for settlement in other countries. 
Table 1 Sending Countries 
 Medical 
Doctor Wages 
(PPP 
Corrected 
Wages, US$) 
(2011) 
Doctor/ 
Patient Ratio (per 
hundred thousand 
inhabitants) (2003) 
Doctor/ 
Patient Ratio 
(per hundred 
thousand 
inhabitants) 
(2010) 
Strikes of Health 
Professionals 
Poland 1498-3222 250 220 2007 
2008 
Romania 808-1819 190 240 2013 
2015 
Data from Eurostat 
 Further, as seen in Table 1.1, the doctor/patient ratio is low in both Poland and Romania. 
These two countries share a similar ratio in 2010, with Poland having 220 doctors per 100,000 
inhabitants and Romania having 240 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants. These numbers indicate the 
difficulty that medical professionals face in these two countries as there are greater densities of 
doctors in the destinations countries for Poland and Romania. As seen in Table 1.1, the ratio of 
doctors in Romania followed an ascendant trend from 2003 to 2010. Regardless, they are still 
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below the European Union average of 346.1 physicians per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011 
(European Health for All Database). Poland is likewise beneath this average.  
Table 2 Destination Countries 
 Medical Doctor 
Wages (PPP 
Corrected Wages, 
US$) (2011) 
Doctor/Patient 
Ratio (per hundred 
thousand 
inhabitants) (2003) 
Doctor/Patient 
Ratio (per hundred 
thousand 
inhabitants) (2010) 
France 4271-7383 340 340 
United Kingdom 2052-9155 220 280 
Italy 4241-9425 410 410 
Germany 3652-7098 340 380 
Data from Eurostat 
Four of the main destination countries for Poland and Romania are France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Germany. Table 1.2 shows the doctor/patient ratios for the destination 
countries that have been popular with Polish and Romanian physicians, and all of these ratios for 
2010 are higher than those in either Poland or Romania. The highest ratio is actually within Italy, 
having 410 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants. Others are similarly ranked, France showing 340 
doctors per 100,000 inhabitants and Germany 380. In comparison to Poland and Romania, the 
United Kingdom is surprisingly similar, with 280 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants. However, 
such a density of doctors may be causal to the requirement efforts that the United Kingdom has 
been conducting. 
In Europe, Poland and Romania rank among the lowest for density of physicians. Italy 
and France do not rank among the highest, though they fall in the top half among other European 
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countries. This similarly relates to the overall ranking that the World Health Organization 
provided each of these countries. While France was ranked 1st, Italy was ranked 2nd. The United 
Kingdom was ranked 19th and Germany 25th. However, Poland was ranked 50th and Romania 
99th.  The higher ranking countries all show much higher densities of physicians as well as more 
efficient health care systems. 
 The challenges that Poland faces are generally similar to those faced by the medical 
sector in Romania. With a history of strikes led by doctors and nurses and their distinct requests 
for significant wage increases, the main concern in the medical sector becomes evident. 
However, neither country has responded with effective reform towards wages or the system as a 
whole. Small increases have been made to wages in both Poland and Romania, but these have 
not met the requests set forth by doctors and nurses. The level of wages are still not competitive 
on the European market, and so medical brain drain ought to still be a concern for these 
governments. 
 In order to adopt an effective health care system, the financial aspects must be reformed 
on a national scale. Neither country has committed to extensive national reforms that could 
properly redistribute medical services in a truly equal fashion. Instead, the reactions have been 
largely attacking the working conditions of doctors and nurses, mainly through placing restraints 
and repercussions on the system of bribery that has become prevalent in both countries. Doctors 
and nurses have come to rely on the personal gifts and payments that patients would offer in 
return for better, quicker, and more effective treatment. The acceptance of such bribes were 
criminalized by the Anti-Corruption Bureau in Poland and the Romanian Court, without being 
equivocally replaced by higher wages. 
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 The reforms seen in Poland and Romania have thus both been highly ineffective in 
capping the medical brain drain or encouraging return migration. Reforms need to be 
implemented across the entire medical sector and focus on drastic financial restructuring. Despite 
patients being opposed to higher contributions on their part, they are necessary to increase the 
medical budget. Romania has taken a step in the right direction by introducing a co-payment 
program for primary care in hospitals. This program can offset costs as well as limit unnecessary 
medical attention sought by some patients. However, the nature of the co-payment program in 
Romania falls short by not including ambulatory or emergency care, thus opening the door for 
patients to seek medical attention through these facets instead. Furthermore, the system needs to 
ensure that it does not disproportionately affect lower-income or chronically ill citizens who may 
not be able to afford such co-payments. Poland’s commercialization reforms are not as positive 
of an initiative, as they attempt to decrease debt rather than bring in more funds for the system. 
They have been met with staff decreases and maximizing hospital beds to the extent of 
inconvenience for patients.  
Despite the nature of these reforms, however, an interesting trend has emerged over the 
past several years. While emigration levels for Poland have come to a plateau, this is not the case 
for Romania, which sees a steady increase. The cause for such a discrepancy is not clear, though 
it may be related to the starting salaries for medical doctors in both countries. Poland offers a 
significantly higher salary to its medical professionals than Romania, and Poland likewise has 
seen economic growth during the 2008 world economic recession, and thus may be providing a 
better market for expansion. For Poland, the health expenditure has been slowly rising, though 
still falls short of the OECD average. From 2000 to 2012, the health expenditure as a percentage 
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of total GDP rose from 5.5 to 6.8, and thus shows a positive trend that still has room for 
improvement. For Romania in 2013, the percentage was still just 5.34 percent, well below the 
OECD average of 9.3 percent.  
Both Poland and Romania strove to join the European Union, expecting multiple benefits 
from working closely with the other member states. The recent EU directive on patients’ rights 
for cross-border healthcare, which was largely introduced in 2013, can have significant effects 
on the health care that Poland and Romania offer and the health care that their citizens can have 
access to. This directive leads to the potential migration of patients, rather than just medical 
professionals. Under the directive, patients are able to seek healthcare away from home and 
receive reimbursement for their costs. This initiative, although beneficial for patients in areas 
such as Poland and Romania, with less efficient healthcare systems, provides a lack of incentive 
for these same countries to improve their systems. If their patients can easily cross borders and 
receive higher quality treatment, then these countries do not necessarily have to improve and 
update their systems. Reimbursing their travelling patients may be cheaper and simpler for the 
governments. The directive thus poses a further element of competition among the countries that 
fall behind their fellow EU member states. 
 As other countries in the European Union show, a system with universal coverage is not 
necessarily one that is run by corruption and inequality. Instead, the health care system should be 
a priority for the countries, especially when experiencing an aging population, as is the current 
trend across Europe. The more successful systems are seen to allocate 6 to14 percent of the 
national GDP towards health care (Drăgoi and Ţarțavulea, 2014). If Poland and Romania want to 
see a more efficient system within their borders, and to in turn maintain sufficient numbers of 
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doctors and nurses, they will need to be willing to spend more money on maintaining and 
operating their hospitals and medical services. Wages need to increase, medical equipment needs 
to be updated, and treatments should be equally accessible in all parts of the country. Without 
such reforms, the countries should expect to continue seeing a consistent decrease in their 
population of medical professionals. 
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